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 Abstract 
Based	on	the	theoretical	frame	of	prospect	theory,	this	paper	investigates	consumer	decision	on	
two	forms	of	loss	aversion,	the	endowment	effect	and	choice	restriction	(otherwise	known	as	a	phantom	
alternative).	 This	 study	 provides	 evidence	 that	 an	 endowment	 effect	 without	 actual	 possession	 is	
occurring	 in	coupons	and	that	consumer	behavior	on	choice	restriction	 is	consistent	with	 literature	on	
commodity	theory.	Results	indicate	that	choice	restriction	and	the	endowment	effect	cause	preference	
formation,	 even	when	doing	 so	 opposes	 rational	 choice	 theory.	 The	 competing	 effects	 show	 that	 the	
endowment	effect	dominates	the	restriction	effect.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	Introduction 
Loss aversion is an influential psychological phenomenon and can be present when it 
comes to making decisions in almost any scenario. Examples of loss aversion can be seen in 
daily routine and common occurrences. Consider that an investor is holding onto a failing stock 
and refuses to sell it for anything less than what he purchased it for, an individual is staying in a 
long-term relationship that is not beneficial for them and is too scared to leave, a man buys 
tickets to a concert and realizes he does not like the band but stays the entire time because he 
paid for his ticket. These examples all demonstrate some form of loss aversion, whether if it is a  
status quo bias, sunk cost fallacy, or an endowment effect. It is likely that loss aversion evolved 
in humans as a protective mechanism, but ironically there are many cases in which loss aversion 
can lead individuals away from rational decisions and towards sub-optimal choices.  The purpose 
of this study is to analyze the endowment effect and choice-restriction on consumer choice 
through the lens of loss aversion and prospect theory. This study uses a within-subjects stated 
preference experiment to verify if coupons can elicit an endowment effect and to determine if 
either of the effects causes object preference—even when it may not be the most utility 
maximizing choice.  
Theoretical Analysis  
Rationality is often bounded by the limited information that or the limited computational 
capacity we may have in a finite amount of time, because of this  an individual does not always 
prefer scenarios with the most expected utility. Take for example the scenario where an 
individual must choose between two options, one option is a sure chance to receive a moderate 
sum of money, whereas the other option is a lower chance to either receive a larger sum of 
money or receive nothing (Slovic and Lichenstein 1983, Simon 1971). Since individuals are 
generally risk averse they will choose the smaller sum of money, even if the expected value of 
the alternative option is greater. If rational choice was considered a positive economic theory, 
based on objective facts rather than subjective factors such as risk aversion, then most 
individuals would pick the option with the highest expected value, regardless of how much risk 
was involved. In less computationally demanding scenarios, normative theories are usually an 
accurate representation of how consumers react, but in cases where a situation is more 
computationally demanding individuals do not necessarily evaluate expected value.  
Kahneman and Tversky(1979) use this concept to  illustrate the difference between prospect 
theory and expected utility theory. Consider that a prospect is the chance of receiving one of two 
payoffs; (x, a, y, b) the first payoff (x) has (a), probability of occurring, the second payoff (y) 
occurs with a probability of (b). 
 
 
Equation 1: Expected Utility 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑎𝑈 𝑤 + 𝑥 + 𝑏𝑈 𝑤 + 𝑦 									𝑖𝑓	𝑎 + 𝑏 = 1 
This equation expresses expected utility as the utility gained from your initial wealth (w) plus 
the payoff of the expected value of (x) and (y).  Since the probabilities add up to one, there is no 
room for an additional outcome in this equation, but you can make room for multiple outcomes 
in this model. The researchers use a series of stated preference survey questions that were created 
to highlight inconsistencies between expected value and participant behavior. As mentioned, the 
rule of thumb for expected utility is to always choose the option that gives the highest expected 
utility, regardless of risk. Kahneman and Tverksy realized that this model was not the best for 
modeling human behavior and instead used similar scenarios to the following two below in order 
to point out  inconsistencies between maximum expected utility and individual choice. They 
confirm that the choices individuals make are not in line with what expected value and utility 
indicates on should choose and that despite expected value being the same, framing of a situation 
is very important in regard to choose.  
1.) Choose between: 
a.) 50% chance to either receive 1,000 or nothing 
b.) 100% chance to receive 500.  
2.)  
a.) Choose between a 50% chance to lose 1,000 or nothing 
b.) 100% chance to lose 500. 
For either question, scenarios (a) and (b) have the same expected utility. However, Khaneman et 
al. (1979) discover that most individuals choose choice two in part (a) and choice one in part (b). 
Since the choices in both a and b have an equivalent expected value, it shouldn’t matter which 
choice individuals pick, but  results illustrate the complexity of decision in individuals, 
indicating that individuals are risk averse by preferring a sure chance at $500 rather than a 50% 
chance at having $1000, but also loss averse to the point that where they demonstrate risk 
seeking behavior in order to avoid losses. This is shown when individuals are more willing to 
have a 50% chance of losing $1,000 so that they do not have to pay out $500. A more intuitive 
way to conceptualize this is to think of after a bet, how often does the loser utter the phrase 
“Double or nothing?” only to shortly owe double the amount. In this scenario, the desire to win 
the second bet and recoup losses is greater than the desire to win the initial bet. 
 Khaneman et al (1979) use this insight to come up with a more suitable method of 
analyzing individual decision behavior by developing a model that replaces the objective 
probability values of (a and b) with subjective decision weights π(a) and π(b) which depend on 
the risk seeking preferences of the individual. In expected utility theory, an individual would 
calculate and choose the scenario which would grant the highest expected utility, in the prospect 
theory model an individual gauges the value of each prospect and then makes their unique 
subjective decision.  
Equation 2: Prospect theory 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑥, 𝑎; 𝑦, 𝑏 = 𝜋 𝑎 𝑣 𝑤 + 𝑥 + 𝜋 𝑏 𝑣(𝑤 + 𝑦) 
 
The characteristics of this value function are illustrated in figure one, value (the subjective utility 
of an individual) is convex for losses and concave for gains to portray the effect of risk and loss 
aversion. Since the slope is steeper for losses than for gains, this implies that losses hurt more 
than equivalent gains.   
                                           
As mentioned, in this study, the endowment effect is controlled for by the presence of a coupon. 
Thaler (1980), contributes to Kahneman’s explanation of prospect theory by stating that direct 
costs are viewed as losses and opportunity costs are forgone gains. Based on Thaler’s insight, 
choosing a similar sale item over a coupon item comes at a direct cost of not having the coupon 
item. On the other hand, choosing the coupon item will come at the opportunity cost of not 
picking the sale item.  Assume that a coupon item and a sale item are equal in every attribute. 
This model shows that choosing the sale item over the coupon item leads to an equal gain and  
loss on just the horizontal axis (see figure 1.2 below), but if one includes both axes then total 
utility is negative due to the shape of the utility function. The model is represented this way 
because not having a coupon item is seen as a direct cost (a loss) whereas not having the sale 
item is seen as a forgone gain.  
O$>(/'!AI?!!
 
Thus, according to figure 1.2 if a coupon does indeed elicit an endowment effect, (which is 
supported by Sen et al (1997) then an individual should have preference for a coupon item over 
an equivalent sale item.  Choice restriction and scarcity is also involved when it comes to 
prospect theory. Cialdini (1985) argues that as individuals have restrictions placed on their 
choices they feel a threat to their freedoms, the desire to preserve their freedoms is a result of 
loss aversion as individuals that have restrictions placed on their choices, or must compete for 
scarce items believe that if they do not obtain the scarce item soon then they will lose the 
opportunity to do so in the future. This phenomenon is known as the scarcity heuristic and 
suggests that opportunities become more attractive as their availability decreases. Often, the 
desire to preserve freedoms that are taken away is known as psychological reactance theory and 
will result in individuals acting out to re-establish the freedom.   
'
'
 
Endowment Effect in Choice 
 
The endowment effect, also known as the ownership effect, is the hypothesis that an 
individual overvalues an item they already own because individuals are generally loss averse. 
The endowment effect can be seen in influencing behavior in many regular scenarios. Price 
negotiation between a car dealer and a car owner attempting to sell his car is often a long, 
arduous process. The car owner overvalues his vehicle in accordance with the endowment effect, 
while the dealer prices the vehicle based upon more objective elements such as market value. 
The impact of status quo bias and loss aversion make the owner more reluctant to part with the 
car unless he received.The endowment effect also occurs in an online setting, specifically with 
websites which allow customers to try a premium membership for free for a limited time. For 
example, Amazon allows users to have a six month free membership to their “prime “shipping 
service, after six months it charges $100 for an annual membership These websites often alert 
trial members that they will be charged the monthly membership fee if they do not cancel their 
current trial membership within a specific timeframe.  Having had temporary ownership of a trial 
service elicits an endowment effect and as a result consumers are more likely to pay for the 
continued service whereas they may never have subscribed to the service in the first place. 
Another example of the endowment effect is seen in the film processing industry.  Companies 
will often print every photo submitted, regardless of quality.  Although consumers usually have 
the opportunity to return any photos, many do not choose to take advantage of this return policy 
despite the poor quality of some of the photos and instead individuals choose to keep the 
imperfect and flawed photos even though replacing them would be at no extra cost 
In order to attribute loss aversion as one of the mechanism behind the endowment effect 
their experiment, Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler (1979) had participants come to an agreement 
on the valuation of mug prices. Participants were divided between groups of buyers and sellers. 
Sellers were given a university mug and buyers made offers to purchase it from them. When no 
one had explicit ownership of the mug, individuals were easily able to agree on price. In the next 
round sellers were now given the mug to keep if they wanted it, loss aversion was attributed as 
the reason for the uncooperative behavior of the participants since they could no longer agree as 
easily on price.  
When it comes to the reasons as to why the endowment effect operates, there is some 
disagreement in the literature in regard to why the endowment effect causes an individual to 
overvalue an item. Researchers conducted a study similar study to Kahneman’s with the 
hypothesis that the endowment effect does not pertain to loss aversion, but rather the effect of 
mere ownership (Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, Wilson 2009). Similar to Khaneman’s experiment, 
this between-subjects study had buyers and sellers attempt to agree on the price of a mug. To 
ensure that the notion of diminishing marginal utility (through the purchase of a repeat product) 
did not skew the results, the experimenters included a condition in which nonowner-pair-buyers 
were not given a mug and were asked to make a series of choices- they chose between receiving 
a pair of identical mugs or a monetary sum. By comparing the nonowner-pair-buyers to the 
nonowner-buyers, the experimenters could determine whether diminishing marginal utility had 
influenced responses. The results revealed that if a buyer and seller already owned the same 
mug, they both valued the mug at a higher price than if only the seller owned the mug (and the 
buyer did not). This indicated that mere ownership caused individuals to overvalue an item 
because they owned it and psychologically associate familiar items in a positive light, but not 
because they were affected by loss aversion therefore is not correlated to prospect theory and 
loss aversion. Based on the literature, there is still no consensus as to which is the main 
mechanism for the endowment effect. The best way to phrase it would be to say that it depends, 
specifically on a case by case basis since even though people are loss averse on average, loss 
aversion can still vary between people. This leads to individuals overvaluing an object based on 
just the exposure effect, or the endowment and exposure effect work in tandem and object 
overvaluation is cause by both loss aversion and an ownership effect. Some of the characteristics 
that were observed to be statistically significant when it came to loss aversion was age, the older 
one was the more likely they were to experience loss aversion with an endowed item. 
Additionally, as education and product knowledge increased the likelihood of experiencing loss 
aversion decreased Johnson, Gatcher and Hermann (2006).  A study that supports this viewpoint 
is  
List (2004)	investigates	pitting	neoclassical theory against prospect theory in an experimental 
market setting. Neoclassical theory suggests that preference between two items is independent of 
an individual’s current entitlements. However, others have claimed that neoclassical theory is not 
an appropriate assessment of how markets may operate, suggesting that individual behavior 
within a marketplace is more in line prospect theory. In order to verify which theory best 
matches a marketplace setting, List conducts a field experiment to determine the real trading 
behavior of individuals. Results of the experiment demonstrate that the endowment effect decays 
with experience; experienced buyers become more willing to part with their endowments than 
less experienced buyers and agents learn to leave their endowments as an opportunity cost rather 
than a loss, allowing for more efficient transactions over time. However, when sellers and 
consumers are not as experienced in a market then behavior in line with prospect theory is more 
prevalent. While the literature is divided between focusing on the endowment effect or the 
ownership effect, those that focus on the endowment effect attribute loss aversion as a significant 
cause for object overvaluation.  
Studies suggest that just touching an object can elicit an endowment effect which in turn 
can influence consumers to buy the item. Peck and Shu (2009) mention that in 2003 the Illinois 
State Attorney General’s Office warned holiday shoppers to be  of retailers that encourage them 
to touch, hold and imagine that they owned a product, because this may lead to unnecessary or 
unplanned consumption. Peck and Shu conducted an experiment in which they asked non-
owners of an object to touch the object and observed if perceived ownership and object valuation 
increased. They also used ownership imagery to manipulate the feelings of ownership when 
touching the object was not possible. In both cases, they find that there is an increase in object 
valuation implying that the endowment effect is present. 
 The endowment effect also applies to coupons, as an individual often believes to have 
partial ownership of an item when holding onto a coupon for that item. Even if the consumer 
imagines owning the item there is an increase in the possibility of the endowment effect taking 
place. To verify that coupons can elicit an endowment effect,  Sen, Sankar and Johnson 
conducted an experiment in which participants were taken to a restaurant and given the 
opportunity to use a coupon. Their findings show that possession of a coupon led to an increase 
in the preference for that item (1997). Having a coupon for a choice option leads consumers to 
assign that option as a reference point and the remaining options are evaluated in comparison to 
the coupon item. Even if the advantages and disadvantages of the coupon item and an alternative 
are equivalent both loss aversion and the status quo bias will cause the consumer to prefer the 
couponed item. On the other hand, a study by Tom, Gail, Nelson, King and Srzentic 
demonstrates that the endowment effect is only responsible for increasing the perceived value of 
an item and is unrelated to object preference. Instead, they attribute object preference to the 
exposure effect which states that individuals prefer objects that they are familiar with, which 
inherently includes objects that they own (2007). Thus, it is difficult to discern whether the 
endowment or exposure effect is specifically responsible for object preference in that they often 
work in tandem 
 
Choice Restriction  
In probability theory, Luce’s choice axiom states that in a repeated choice setting, the 
inclusion of an unavailable option does not affect the consumer’s choice, therefore the 
unavailable option’s presence or absence is irrelevant (1959). Studies on phantom choice theory 
contradict this notion such as Pratkanis and Farquhar’s (1992) extensive review on the history of 
phantom choice alternatives. One of the most predominant cases of phantom choice occurs when 
purchasing products online. As opposed to in a physical store, unavailable products are still 
displayed on the website, but with a “out of stock” or “unavailable” notice. The hospitality 
industry employs this strategy, specific hotel booking sites will show consumers rooms that are 
unavailable and similar to the ones that are currently available. This marketing tactic increases 
the perceived attractiveness of the available room and also creates a sense of urgency for the 
consumer. Pratkanis and Farquhar define a phantom choice or phantom alternative  as an option 
that looks real but is unavailable at the time a decision is made. They review several other studies 
that analyze phantom choice theory, and find that individuals fixate on the phantom, looking for 
attributes of the phantom alternative in other items and experience frustration for not being able 
to choose the phantom since due its unavailability, perceived value of the phantom and desire to 
obtain it increases.  
While there are not many studies that directly investigate the effects of choice restriction, 
literature on commodity theory can overlap with choice restriction since both are focused on 
scarcity. Standard commodity theory suggests that scarce items are inherently more attractive to 
consumers.  Consumers assume that out-of-stock items have more value in that there is 
heightened demand for that item. The item could be a highly trusted brand (which indicates 
quality), a good bargain, or a combination of these two.  Brock’s (1968) definition of commodity 
theory is that any useful commodity will be valued to the extent that it is scarce, unavailable, or 
difficult to obtain.  Brock incorporates choice restriction as a component of scarcity and suggests 
that people desire scarce commodities more than comparable available commodities because of 
the increase in perceived value and a desire for uniqueness.  This phenomenon is referred to as 
the scarcity heuristic, and plays a role in consumer choice. Consumers have learned to associate 
attributes of scarcity, price and value with one another. Similar to the endowment effect, the 
scarcity heuristic is related to prospect theory and loss aversion. Consumers associate restricted 
choice with loss of freedom—a loss that can only be compensated for by obtaining that restricted 
item (Cialdini Chapter 7, 209). 
There is considerable empirical evidence supporting Brock’s theory. Lynn, for instance 
conducted a meta-analysis of 46 studies which confirms the robustness of commodity theory 
(1991). The strength of this principle is utilized to create effective advertising campaigns, with 
verbiage such as “buy while supplies last”, “only one allowed per customer”, “two left in stock.”  
The framing of the scarcity plays a vital role in its influence over consumer choice. 
Verhallen’s 1982 study analyzes the framing of an unavailable item and adds a level of 
complexity to commodity theory. Verhallen had female participants choose between three 
cookbooks with varying availability to examine the influence of this availability on their 
preference between the cookbooks. 30 copies were available of the 1st book, 16 of the 2nd, and 
only 6 of the 3rd. Verhalen also varied the framing of the unavailability- he attributed the 
unavailability to varying factors such as accidental reasons, popularity, limited supply and a 
combination of popularity and limited supply. The results show that consumers preferred the 
books that were the scarcest and that the reason for their unavailability was vital their decisions. 
The book that had “accidental unavailability” was seen as the least attractive, whereas the book 
that was unavailable due to high demand was perceived as the most attractive. In a secondary 
experiment, Verhallen analyzed how the shift in availability influences demand.  In this 
experiment one cookbook was available, one was unavailable, and one had its availability shifted 
from unavailable to available. The book with the availability shift became the most attractive to 
consumers and the book that was currently unavailable became the least attractive. This negative 
outlook towards unavailable goods is known as the frustration theory, which makes subjects 
more prone to devaluing an object that is unavailable to them. Frustration theory actually 
contradicts commodity theory in the sense that individuals convince themselves that they do not 
want the scarce item because of how difficult it may be to obtain. This phenomenon can be most 
prevalent in the recruitment industry, let’s say that an individual sees a competitive job ad online 
and bookmarks the ad to apply later. When revisiting the bookmark, the individual realizes that 
the job post has been taken down because it was filled. In the context of frustration theory, the 
individual would no longer want the position and convince himself that it was for the best. 
However, in a different context that is not related to frustration theory, the individual would look 
for jobs that shared similar description to the one that was just filled and would want to find a 
similar job even more so than before. 
In a similar experiment, (Worchel, Lee & Adewole 1975) asked participants to rate the value 
and attractiveness of cookies that were in plentiful supply and cookies that were in scarce supply. 
The participants were told that the cookies in scarce supply due to two different factors, each 
representing a separate experimental condition.  In the first condition participicants were told that 
the scarcity was due to an accident in baking the cookies, while in the other condition they were 
told they were scarce due to high demand. Results displayed that participants rated the scarce 
cookies overall as more attractive, with specifically the high demand scarce condition as more 
attractive then the accidential condition.  These factors had no effect on taste.   
 Aronson and Carlsmith (1963) also explored the framing of scarcity in relation to 
commodity theory.  The researchers had five-year-old children play with toy cars and also rate 
the attractiveness of each of the cars. In separate conditions, the experimenters asked children not 
to play with one of the toy cars and they varied the tone of their request. In one condition the 
experimenter selected one of the toy cars and slightly discouraged the children from playing with 
it. In a different scenario researchers strongly discouraged the children from playing with one of 
the toy cars and said that they would be very angry if they did play with it. After the children 
rated the cars the researchers found that those who received the stronger discouragement rated 
the restricted toy car as the most valuable, but those that were not as discouraged actually 
devalued the restricted toy car below other cars.  
This group of studies demonstrates that the framing of scarcity and the cost of obtaining the 
unavailable item influences how consumers behave. In Worchel’s experiment, the cookies that 
were scarce due to high demand were most attractive, especially because they had the potential 
to become completely unavailable. Thus, in a market setting the consumers would be more likely 
to pay a higher premium for the scarce cookies, despite there being no difference in quality or 
taste. The scarcity heuristic is influencing consumers to act contrary to utility maximizing 
behavior. 
Often, when one cannot have an something, they search for the next closest thing by looking 
for the attributes of the restricted choice in other items. Researcher investigated the effects of a 
known phantom on judgement and choice of available alternatives (Farquhar and Pratkanis 
1987). Subjects were asked to make a choice between one of two rivaling brands, there was also 
a similar phantom choice that was shown. Subjects were told that the phantom choice was 
unavailable for reasons of being out of stock, not announced yet on the market, or only available 
in Europe. Farquhar and Pratkanis found that in each situation the presence of a phantom 
increase the perceived importance of the attribute in which the phantom excelled in and noticed 
that subjects perceived the available brands as less attractive when a phantom was included. This 
outcome has also been observed in the service industry. In a similar experiment, Woratsheck, 
Roth and Horbel (2005) discover that preference formation can occur due to scarcity. If a 
consumer is not aware of the unavailability or scarcity of an item by the time they make their 
buying decisions they show preference patterns that would be different than if they actually knew 
how scarce the item was.  
In addition to frustration theory there is also the theory of psychological reactance, any threat 
to freedom of choice is going to induce a negative psychological reaction where the individual is 
going to want to regain that freedom.  We can see an example of restriction and reactance theory 
in the case of the forced choice restriction experiment in Helsinki Schools (Lombardini and 
Lankoski 2013.). The experiment was an observation of the behavior of students on vegetarian 
day, where students were only given the option to eat vegetarian meals. Results show that 
psychological reactance was present, in the short-term students demonstrated noncompliance and 
participation in school lunches decreased, furthermore students took less food and food waste 
increased in protest. Government censorship is also another example of reactance theory, which 
often can lead to protests or threats of corruption, even if the censorship may be a measure to 
protect national security. Worchel (1992) Explains that commodity and reactance theory work 
together in the case of censorship, from a commodity standpoint people want to have the 
restricted and unavailable information because it makes them unique, whereas from the reactance 
standpoint, having information censored threatens the freedom of the individual, motivating 
them to regain their freedom by acquiring this censored information. An additional study that 
looked at censorship (Worchel, Arnold 1973) verifies this perception. The experimenters were 
made to hear a speech and told that another previously prepared speech had been censored and 
made unavailable due to the position it had taken. Researchers discovered that when hearing this, 
participants wanted to hear this speech and began to change their previous stance on the topic 
toward what the censored speech had been about, even without having heard it yet.  
As mentioned in the theoretical analysis, reactance theory can be directly attributed to the 
idea that individuals believe that their freedoms are being taken away. An odd historical example 
that was studied (Mazis, Settle and Leslie 1972) goes to show how the threat of eliminating 
freedoms can have a very negative reactance in individuals. In 1971 Florida imposed anti-
phosphate ordinance use, which was basically seen in soaps, detergents and many other cleaning 
agents. The possession and use of anti-phosphates became illegal. The reactance to this 
legislation was huge. As a result, many Floridians turned to smuggling soaps, anti-phosphates 
became a precious and illegally traded commodity and the desire for them increased than before 
they were illegal. Certain families would hoard decades worth of soaps in a hidden spot on their 
property. Not only did the demand for anti-phosphates increase to levels that were higher than 
before, but individuals also came to see phosphate cleaners in a positive light and as high quality 
products, however the actual quality of the product never changed, their perception of the item 
changed because it became so scarce and unavailable.   In some cases, reactance theory can also 
be positive. Botti et al (2008) conduct a conceptual framework for different situational 
restrictions and discuss that a restriction can be positive when it lines up with one’s goals. For 
example, to contradict the Lombardini and Lakoski experiment let’s say an individual is 
dedicated to losing weight and the school cafeteria only provides vegetarian food. Seeing as to 
how this may be a healthy alternative, we may not show a negative reactance like most the 
participants in the study did because the restriction supports what we want. Often, this reframed 
perspective is overlooked when it comes to academic studies on scarcity.  
This section has discussed how preferences can change due to prospect theory and scarcity 
heuristics, but there is also support that neoclassical theory still holds true. Hoyer (1984) 
conducts a study which indicates that individuals know exactly what their preferences are before 
going into the store. This demonstrates that people actually are maximizing utility when they go 
to the store or supermarket and is in line with rational choice theory. Using participants that were 
actual shoppers, Hoyer analyzed that it took the average consumer 13 seconds to purchase their 
first item from the moment they walked into the store, showing no deliberate thought process. 
However, he noticed that the more important that a product was to consumers the more complex 
the decision process would be. Hoyer mentions that while this experiment was a simple 
supermarket experiment, purchases that would entail higher risks would require more time and 
external research from the consumer before purchasing the product. When interviewing the 
participants, Hoyer asked how they made their purchasing decisions so quickly. Typical 
responses were that they trusted the product, it was cheap and worked effectively. This concept 
relates closely to List’s application of prospect theory (2004). List mentions that consumers 
whose behaviors match closely with neoclassical models are those that are more experienced 
with purchasing within a certain market, in the case of a supermarket, that is something most 
shoppers tend to do every day. However, the psychological effects invoked by prospect theory 
are believed to be more prevalent in inexperienced consumers. Under this hypothesis prospect 
theory, which encapsulates both the endowment effect and choice restriction effect, may be more 
evident in irregular goods. However, there are critics of this notion that have conducted 
experiments which have allowed them to conclude that intuition cannot be corrected with 
repetition, even if a consumer knows the economic value of an item and the market clearing 
price, judgements will continue to be made in ways that are inconsistent with conventional 
economics (Knetsch and Sinden 1987). These judgement fallacies would be the most prevalent in 
situations of price framing, such as price reductions and discounts.  In addition, we can claim 
that the participants in this experiment may have been subject to the status quo bias and were 
potentially too risk averse to buy products that they were not used to, which would go against 
rational choice theory since this bias could potentially prevent a consumer from making an 
optimal purchasing decision. 
 
Methodology and Hypotheses  
This study uses a within-subjects stated preference survey to investigate how the endowment 
effect and choice restriction influence consumer decision. Stated preference is the standard 
method that researchers have employed in studies of the endowment effect or commodity theory 
(Sen et al 1997, Worchel, Lee & Adewole 1975, Aronson and Carlsmith 1963, Farquhar and 
Pratkanis 1987, Verhallen 1982). The difference between this study and the studies that are listed 
is that the other studies were conducted as field experiments, whereas this study takes place in an 
online setting, specifically through Amazon Mechanical Turk’s (MTurk) platform.  
The survey consists of two sections designed to observe how participants react to a coupon 
item or a restricted item under varying conditions.  This survey analyzes the responses of 182 
participants that chose to be a part of the study and were paid upon completion. Ages of the 
participants range from 21 to 65 years old, 60% of the participants are male, all the participants 
are United States residents and come from a diversified economic background 
 The two sections of the survey are as follows:  
1.) Section one is a one round setting and consists of five total questions (See Figure 2 
below) to verify the findings in Sen et al (1997); coupons elicit an endowment effect in 
consumers and the endowment effect is responsible for preference formation in objects. 
As noted, this finding is unsupported in other studies, such as Tom et al (2007) which 
claims that even if a coupon creates an endowment effect, the endowment effect only 
causes an increase in object valuation and not preference. Instead, they attributed the 
exposure effect as the reason for preference formation and that the two effects can occur 
simultaneously.  
  
2.)! Section two is a two-round setting developed to analyze how participants react to a 
restricted choice. In the first-round participants are made aware that there is a restricted 
item and are not allowed to select it, but can physically see the restricted option. This is 
like the setup of experiments that analyze phantom choice theory (Pratkanis and Farquhar 
1992). Making participants aware of the restricted item and its attributes is what Pratkanis 
and Farquhar use to determine if consumers use the restricted item as a reference point 
when it comes to choosing among options that are available. In the second round the 
restriction is removed and participants are free to pick the restricted item if they wish to 
do so. This two round setting is used in Verhallen’s (1982) experiments, Verhallen 
shifted the unavailability of an item from unavailable to available to determine if object 
preference increased. As participants in this survey move on to the second round, they are 
reminded of what was previously restricted by having the last round shown beside the 
current round (See Figure 3 below). Section two contains two rounds of three questions, 
the first two questions of section two analyze participant decision regarding a restricted 
item, whereas the third question of section two incorporates a coupon item into the choice 
set (Figure 4). This direct comparison between the restricted item and the coupon item 
allows this study to determine if either the coupon effect or the restriction effect can 
dominate over the other. This has yet to be considered in other literature and since both 
the effects are a form of loss aversion, using the prospect theory model does not indicate 
which effect is greater.  
 
 Before participants answer any questions, they are introduced to the hypothetical setting of 
the survey. Participants are told that they are given a unique set of coupons from a store as a 
reward for being a loyal patron. Participants are then asked to state their preference on which 
item they would prefer and the items that they have coupons for will be marked by a picture of a 
coupon item (See figure two, questions 1.2 – 1.5). There are controls to make sure that the this 
study is not accidentally measuring outside factors. As seen in figures two and three, products 
that participants must choose between are only differentiated by price and letter (“Brand A” 
through “D”). This is done to eliminate brand loyalty, brand appeal or any form of external 
preference for a specific product other than an endowment effect.  This experiment uses the 
hypothetical setting of being in an electronics store and choosing between different headphones, 
tablets, computer mouse devices or laptops to keep a consistent comparison between one type of 
product (electronic items) as it would unnecessarily complicate the experiment to compare 
between a variety of products such as groceries, office supplies, books, etc.  It is also beneficial 
to use electronic products since it is easier to have control over a large variance in price. 
Participants are randomized into either a high-price or a low-price condition. Figure 2, (questions 
1.1 – 1.5) shows a high price scenarios, whereas figure 4 (question 2.2) shows a low-price 
scenario. Controlling for price is done necessary to determine if coupon preference is consistence 
across products with high prices and seemingly larger discounts. For example, a retail discount 
from a coupon item can range from over $100 for a high-price scenario product to $3 for a low-
price scenario product, but the reduction from their retail price will be consistent at 10%. 
 Since this experiment varies price it is important to mitigate the possibility of price serving 
as a signaling mechanism for quality. To control for this, participants are told that all products 
are nearly identical, and that they are comparable in both size and quality. If the model for 
expected utility is an accurate way to represent consumer behavior, then participants should – no 
matter what—pick the cheapest item in every choice set. The cheapest item offers the most 
utility, since participants will receive little to no difference in quality for a lower price.   If this is 
not the case then participants either do not behave in a rational way or they are being influenced 
by a personal subjective decision weight (Demonstrated in equation 2). Finally, based on results 
from Verhallen (1982) and Worchel et al (1975), framing why an item is restricted is important 
in how a consumer reacts to the restriction. In section two, across questions 2.1 – 2.3 , 
participants were randomly assigned to a high or a low-price scenario and also were told that an 
item is restricted because it is either “sold out” or it was “unavailable” and given no further 
context. 
When it comes to the analytical methodology of similar experiments, studies such as Sen et 
al (1997) used a multinomial logit model to determine if the endowment effect caused object 
preference. Since their experiment was conducted in a restaurant setting and the coupon items 
were based on the menu, there were many variables to control for. Some included different 
attributes of meals, types of cuisine (Italian, Chinese, American) and the atmosphere of the 
restaurant, which makes the logit model necessary. However, this experiment takes a different 
approach. In the development of this survey, each individual question was designed with a 
specific condition to determine when preference for either the restricted item or the coupon item 
no longer holds. The specific conditions in each section can be seen in Figures 2 & 3 or in the 
appendix. In order to determine how choice is different across prices this study uses a Chi (2) test 
of independence which is also seen in Verhallen’s (1982) experiment when determining how 
framing effects consumer reaction to restriction.  To verify if there is a specific preference for a 
particular item, this study compares percentages and determines if they are statistically 
significant by conducting a one or two-sample test of proportions.   
Based on the robust relationship between scarcity and consumer demand demonstrated by 
Lynn’s (1991) meta-analysis of commodity theory, the first hypothesis is that participants will 
prefer to choose the restricted item when it becomes available in the second round. Though 
literature for the endowment effect is conflicted on whether the endowment effect causes 
increased object valuation or object preference, the hypothesis for the coupon item is that it 
should also be the preferred choice in most scenarios since the endowment effect can be 
attributed to loss aversion.  When theorizing which of the effects dominate, one must consider 
which choice is a bigger loss in the context of prospect theory; either losing an item one feels 
ownership of (or partial ownership according to Sen) or losing the freedom of having access to 
an item.  In terms of high or low price-scenarios, the hypothesis is that individuals will prefer  
the coupon item when it is in the higher price category because the coupon reduction of a high 
price scenario would appear higher than the reduction in price of a low-price scenario item. In 
respect to the framing of the restriction, due to the findings of Verhallen’s (1982) and Worchel, 
Lee & Adewole’s (1975), it is hypothesized that more participants will prefer t the restricted item 
in the “sold-out” scenario rather than in the “unavailable” scenario.  
Furthermore, this study eliminates an exposure effect since there should be no brand loyalty 
and products marked “A” through “D” only vary by price or availability. Thus, it can be 
determined if the endowment effect does indeed cause object preference.  
Hypothetical Bias and the Use of Amazon Mechanical Turk  
When formulating these hypotheses, it is important to note that this is an online stated 
preference survey, whereas the previous experiments discussed have been field experiments in 
which participants chose a physical product (and not a hypothetical one).  One must consider the 
effects of hypothetical bias on survey results. Hypothetical bias is the notion that stated 
preference and revealed preferences do not always align in a hypothetical setting. There can be 
deviation between stated preference surveys and real market evidence. In a standard survey, 
there is no direct requirement for a participant to follow through on the choice they have made, 
but doing so would show their revealed preference since each choice has an opportunity cost. In 
a hypothetical setting is also no real incentive to show revealed preference, since in the case of a 
survey the participant is often going to be paid regardless. A stated choice experiment can reduce 
hypothetical bias by making the experiment incentive-compatible, in which the participant’s 
choices come with an enforceable outcome (Fifer, Rose and Greaves 2006). While incentive 
compatible methods can be used to mitigate hypothetical bias, they can also be quite expensive 
and not as versatile when it comes to implementation of specific experiments. While not as 
effective as an enforced choice, “Cheap talk” has been another method used to mitigate 
hypothetical bias. Cheap talk is the display of a message shown to survey participants that 
discusses the negative impacts of hypothetical bias and the importance of trying to be aware of it 
as to prevent responding in a biased way. “Cheap talk” is easier to implement, but there have 
been mixed results as to the effectiveness in mitigating bias. A phone survey administered to 
over 4,000 households detected hypothetical bias by comparing information on revealed choice 
and stated preference, using a short “Cheap-talk” script was believed to exacerbate hypothetical 
bias (Aadland and Caplan 2006).  Other investigations mention that the use of cheap talk in their 
surveys yielded a reduction in hypothetical bias in a willingness to pay model, which can be 
more susceptible to bias than a stated preference model (Lusk 2003). However, since the survey 
in this experiment is designed to just have participants choose which item they prefer and not 
analyze willingness to pay, there is not as big of a threat from hypothetical bias.  
While the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk) does not mitigate hypothetical bias, 
collecting data from sources such as mturk can reduce the biases found in traditional samples 
such as academic settings (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava & John 2004). Mturk is a microtask 
marketplace established by Amazon.com, inc. The process for using mturk goes in three stages, 
requesters design and post their task, workers choose which tasks they wish to perform and if the 
workers finish a task to completion and to the satisfaction of the requester, then they are 
compensated. Social scientists typically use mturk to recruit human subjects for surveys and 
experiments. A comparison of mturk samples were analyzed to determine the diversity of mturk 
participants. The demographics of 3,006 mturk participants coming from over 50 different 
countries and 50 U.S states showed that 55% of the participants were female, 36% were non-
white and 31% were non-American. The average mturk participant is  also 32.8 years old with a 
standard deviation of 11.5, compared to 24.3 years old with a standard deviation of 10 for the 
average internet survey participant (Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling 2011).  
Results and Discussion  
(Note: The appendix includes an analytical breakdown of each question)  
As mentioned in the methodology, each question is designed to test a specific condition. In 
section one, conditions not only vary between high and low price, but the components of the 
choice set are also different. This was done to determine the conditions in which participants 
prefer the coupon item. The purpose of each question is shown below. 
Section One 
Question: How do participants respond when 
1.1 There is one cheapest item in the choice set? 
1.2 The price of the coupon item is equal to the price of an alternative item? 
1.3 There is a coupon item and an equivalent sale item in the choice set? 
1.4 There is an option cheaper than both the coupon and sale item in the choice set? 
1.5  The sale item is cheaper than the coupon item? 
 
Chart	1:	Question	1.1	Response		
	 	
 
Since these products are nearly identical in size and quality, the most rational choice – the 
utility maximizing choice—would be to pick the cheapest item of each choice set. Question 1.1 
was designed to specifically test if participants were behaving in this manner. As shown in 
above, “Brand C” is the cheapest item.  The other option is there as a diversion. Results reveal 
that half of the participants are behaving rationally by choosing the cheapest option whereas the 
other half had their choice distributed among options A, B and D. There is also no statistical 
difference caused by high and low price scenarios (Appendix: Table 1.1.B) since χ ² is 
insignificant at 0.420. Therefore, participants did not act in a more rational manner when it came 
to the high price setting. The questions that follower after 1.1 all incorporate a coupon item 
among the choice set.  
49% 51% 
Participant	Response	Question	1.1
Cheapest	Item	 Not	Cheapest	Item	
Chart	2:	Question	1.2	Response		
	  
In question 1.2 the price of the coupon item “Brand A” is equal to the price of an alternative 
item “Brand C”. Since both items are the “cheapest” then there should be an equal proportion of 
participants that choose the coupon item and the alternative item. Instead, there is a substantial 
difference between the two proportions where 80% of participants prefer the coupon item over 
the alternative item. There is also a statistically significant difference between high and low price 
scenarios (Appendix: Tables 1.2.B & C), 74 participants were randomly assigned to the high-
price scenario whereas 103 were assigned to the low-price scenario. Every participant in the high 
price scenario chose the coupon item compared to only 67% of participants in the low-price 
scenario (Appendix: Table 1.2.A). Regardless, in both the high and low price scenario there is 
strong preference for the coupon item. But this is not enough to confirm if there is an endowment 
effect elicited by the coupon item, since it is not clear if object preference for choice A is a result 
of perceived value or if it is due to an endowment effect. To eliminate the influence of perceived 
value, a sale item that is discounted at the same rate as the coupon item is introduced in the next 
question. 
80% 
8% 
12% 
Participant	Response	Question	1.2
Coupon	Item Alternative	Item	 Neither
Chart	3:	Question	1.3	Response		
	 	
As shown in the figure above, the coupon item is “Brand A”, the sale item is “Brand B” and 
an alternative item that costs the same as both is “Brand C”. Using the same logic as in the 
previous scenario, there should theoretically be no difference between the proportion of 
individuals that chose between A, B or C. Results similarly show a different outcome from this 
expectation. Out of a total of 177 participants, 6 participants (3%) chose the alternative item, 58 
participants (33%) chose the sale item and 104 participants (59%) chose the coupon item 
(Appendix: 1.3.A). There is no difference between high or low price scenarios since χ ² is 
insignificant, however a p-value of 0.000 (Appendix: 1.3.C) suggest that there is a highly 
significant difference between the proportion of participants that chose the coupon item and 
those that chose the sale item. After controlling for perceived value there is now distinct 
evidence of an endowment effect in coupon items that causes object preference. This outcome 
supports the conclusions in Sen et al (1997) and goes against the study by Tom et al (2007) 
which claims that the endowment effect does not cause object preference.  
59% 33% 
3% 5% 
Participant	Response	1.3
Coupon	Item Sale	Item	 Alternative	Item Neither
Chart	4:	Question	1.4	Response		
	  
Question 1.4 corresponds to 1.3, the only difference is the addition of an item that is cheaper 
than both the coupon item and the sale item. In figure 2, the coupon item is “Brand A”, the sale 
item is “Brand B” and the cheapest item is “Brand C”. The rational expectation is that 
participants will choose the cheapest item, choice C. It appears that some participants are 
behaving rationally in this scenario; 46 participants (26%) chose C, whereas only 26 participants 
(15%) chose the sale item. This scenario still demonstrates that coupons elicit an endowment 
effect since 82 participants (46%) chose the coupon item which is statistically significant from 
the proportion that chose the cheapest item (Appendix: Table 1.4.C). High and low price 
conditions also affected choice. Out of the 26 individuals that chose the sale item, 22 of them did 
so in the high price setting and only 4 did in the low-price setting. A similar trend is seen for the 
coupon item, out of the 82 participants that chose choice A, 51 did so in the high price setting 
whereas 31 did in the low-price setting (Appendix: Table 1.4.A). When looking only at the high 
price scenario, 74% of individuals <=>>	 	chose the coupon item, even when the cheapest item was 
$77 cheaper. When looking specifically at the low-price scenario, 31% of individuals chose the 
46% 
15% 
26% 
13% 
Participant	Response	Question	1.4
Coupon	Item Sale	Item	 Cheapest	Item Neither
coupon item ?==@@	 			and 23% chose the cheapest item A?=@@	 .	  A proportions test with a p-value 
of 0.057 demonstrates that participants preferred the coupon item even in the low-price 
condition. Questions 1.3 and 1.4 both demonstrate the relationship between coupons and the 
endowment effect, confirming that the endowment increases choice preference in both high and 
low price scenarios.  
Chart	5:	Question	1.5	Response	
	  
In question 1.5 the coupon item is no longer the most preferred choice. When there exists a 
sale item with the same retail value as the coupon item but has a greater discount, then 
participants prefer the sale item. In this case, the rational expectation was to pick the sale item 
since it was not only cheaper than the coupon item, but it was the cheapest item in the choice set. 
A total of 141 participants (78%) chose the sale item, whereas only 19 (10%) chose the coupon 
item and 21 participants (12%) chose neither option (Appendix: Table 1.5.A). While the sale 
item is cheaper than the coupon item, it is only cheaper by $50, which is a small change 
considering that the difference is only 5.5%. In question 1.4 participants preferred the coupon 
10% 
78% 
12% 
Participant	Response	1.5
Coupon	Item Sale	Item	 Neither
item even though the cheapest option was $77 (13%) cheaper, more than double the discount 
between the sale and coupon item in 1.5. The reason as to why participants may prefer the sale 
item in 1.5 may once again have to do with perceived value. The full retail price of the coupon 
and sale item is $1,000 which makes them both the most expensive items in the choice set. 
However, the sale item has gone from the most expensive item in the choice set (At retail value) 
to the cheapest due to the 15% reduction ($150). Therefore, participants may feel that they are 
receiving the best deal, which is enough to overcome the endowment effect of the coupon item.  
Section Two 
Question: How do participants respond when 
2.1 The price of the restricted item is equal to the price of an alternative item? 
2.2 The price of the restricted item is equal to the price of a sale item? 
2.3 The price of the restricted item is less than the price of a coupon item and a sale item?  
Section two analyzes consumer choice in a two-round setting to observe how individuals 
react when a restriction is removed.  
Chart	6:	Question	2.1	(Round	2)	Response		
  
48% 
29% 
23% 
Participant	Response	Question	2.1
Restricted	Item Alternative	Item Neither
In the first round of question 2.1 most participants act rationally by choosing the cheapest 
item. Since the restricted item was unavailable to them, 105 participants (77%) chose the 
alternative item (Appendix: Table 2.1.D). In the second round, the restriction on “Brand D” is 
removed and participants may choose the previously restricted item. The alternative and 
restricted item are both the lowest price options in this choice set. Since this is true, the 
proportion of consumers that choose the restricted item and the proportion that choose the 
alternative item should be equal. However, from the 105 participants that chose the alternative 
item in round 1, only 39 participants (29%) stay with their decision in round two whereas 64 
participants (48%) switch their preference to the restricted item. The proportion of participants 
that prefer the restricted item over the alternative item is statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.000 (Appendix: Table 2.1.G). Therefore, it appears that there is evidence portraying object 
preference for the restricted item. This finding supports the studies on scarcity and commodity 
theory. There appears to be no difference between choice and high or low price conditions. 
However, as found by Verhallen (1982) framing the restricted item as either sold out or 
unavailable does affect how participants react to the restricted item. Looking specifically at the 
difference between U21H2 which is the “unavailable, high-price condition of round 2 in question 
2.1” (Refer to Appendix: “2.1 Key”) and S21H2 “which is the sold-out, high-price condition of 
round 2 in question 2.1”, there seems to be preference towards selecting the restricted item in the 
“sold-out” scenario. In the “sold-out” scenario 30 participants (65%) chose the restricted item, 
whereas in the “unavailable scenario” 19 participants (45%) chose the restricted item (Appendix: 
Tables 2.1.B and C). Comparing these two proportions (Appendix: Table 2.1.F) indicates that 
there is a significant difference between how a participant responds to the restricted item based 
on the framing of the unavailability. But even though their difference is statistically significant, 
in both S21H2 and U21H2 most participants still chose the restricted item over the other 
available options.  
Chart	7:	Question	2.2	(Round	2)	Response		
	  
In the next question the alternative item is replaced with a sale item. Both the restricted item 
“Brand A” and the sale item “Brand D” have the same price, the retail price of the sale item is 
reduced by $50 (7%). In round 1, 154 participants (87%) chose the sale item, which is the most 
rational choice since it is the cheapest item (in round 1). When the restriction was removed in 
round 2 only 22 participants (12%) switched to the restricted item. Like the finding in question 
2.1, participants preferred the restricted item in the “sold-out” scenario over the “unavailable” 
scenario (Appendix: Table 2.2.E). Therefore, when comparing a sale item that is the same price 
as the restricted item, participants prefer the sale item. This can be due to the same reason as to 
why participants preferred the sale item over the coupon item in question 1.5, which is that the 
perceived value of the sale item may be greater than the restricted item.  
12% 
66% 
22% 
Participant	Response	Question	2.2
Restricted	Item Sale	Item Neither
Chart	8:	Question	2.3	(Round	2)	Response		
	  
Finally, in question 2.3 a coupon item is presented in the same choice set as a restricted item to 
determine which effect dominates. The price of the restricted item is less than the price of the 
coupon item to help resolve the issue of perceived value influencing results. Another approach to 
this could have been to restrict a sale item in round 1 (that is equal in value and discount to the 
coupon item) and compare preferences between the sale and coupon item when the sale item is 
made available. As seen in figure above, the price of the restricted item “Brand D” is equal to the 
price of one other alternative item “Brand C”. Both D and C are the cheapest items in this choice 
set. The coupon item and sale item are equivalent, but are more expensive than choices D and C. 
In round 1 105 participants (47%) chose the coupon item, 71 choice the sale item (32%) and 46 
choice the cheapest item (21%). The responses in round 1 (Appendix: Table 2.3.A) are consistent 
with the behavior found in questions 1.4 and 1.3, where participants demonstrated preference for 
the coupon item over an equivalent sale item and over a cheaper item. In round 2 the number of 
participants who chose the sale item went down to 60 and the number of participants that chose 
the coupon item also decreased to 78. When the restriction was removed 55 participants switched 
35% 
27% 
14% 
24% 
Participant	Response	Question	2.3
Coupon	Item Sale	Item Alternative	Item Restricted	Item
their choice to the previously restricted item.  The proportion of individuals that chose between 
the previously restricted item and sale item is not statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.756 
(Appendix: Table 2.3.H). This means that for larger samples, the proportion of participants that 
chose the restricted item and the sale item should be equal.  
When it came to the framing of the restriction, there was no difference between choice in 
the sold-out or unavailable condition (Appendix: Table 2.3.F). There was also no difference 
between choices in respect to high and low price conditions (Table 2.3.E). There is presence of a 
restriction effect occurring, since the proportion of participants that prefer the restricted item 
over the alternative item is statistically significant. While there is no statistical difference 
between the proportion of participants that chose between the sale item and the restricted item, 
there is a significant difference between those that chose the coupon item and those that chose 
either the sale item or the restricted item (Appendix: Tables 2.3.G and J). Since there is no 
difference between participants that chose the sale item and those that chose the restricted item, 
and because the sale item is equivalent to the coupon item; through this transitive relationship it 
is evident that the endowment effect dominates when both a restricted item and a coupon item 
are included in a choice set.  
Implications 
 There is evidence of an endowment effect influencing consumer decision and causing an 
increase in object preference for the endowed item. It is possible that the influence of the 
endowment effect can be greater than what is being measured in this experiment since the 
coupon item may potentially only elicit a partial endowment effect. Occasionally it is also not 
clear and can be difficult to discern if there is object preference based on the endowment effect 
or an exposure effect, since it can be difficult to separate the two. However, this study controls 
for any form of previous exposure due to the design of the survey and the structure and phrasing 
of the questions. In regard to choice-restriction there is evidence of participants preferring the 
restricted item over equal alternatives. The endowment effect seems to be the more powerful 
form of loss aversion in this study and participant responses line up with prospect theory. For 
example, in terms of rational choice and expected utility theory, there were several instances in 
when it would have been more utility maximizing to not pick the coupon item however 
participant responses seem to be based off a subjective decision weight that does not follow the 
same principle as utility theory. However, when it was more apparent that the perceived value of 
the sale item was greater than both the coupon item and the restricted item, it was more likely 
that individuals responded more consistently with rational choice theory.  
 These findings could have implications for both consumers as well as firms. In the case 
of firms, since choice restriction relates to commodity theory and scarcity, many marketing 
campaigns rely on portraying scarcity to increase revenue. However, because the endowment 
effect was stronger than the restriction effect, it is important to consider how to elicit an 
endowment effect in the sale of the firm’s items. Since preference for coupons item was more 
prevalent in the high price setting, one suggestion can be to experiment with replace higher 
priced sales with coupons. Also, instead of making the coupons extremely accessible and 
potentially washing down any endowment effect, it may be more effective to personally mail 
coupons to customers, especially those that may have a membership to a certain firm. When it 
comes to consumers, it is important to be aware of the psychological influence of loss aversion in 
order to eliminate any consumption behavior that is not utility maximizing. Also, if one is trying 
to reduce their spending taking advantage of trial for certain product or a membership can be an 
appealing. However, this can result in unplanned purchasing decision in the long run.  
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Appendix 
Tables  
Question 1.1 Analysis  
Condition: One Cheapest Item 
1.1 (Key) 
U11L question 1.1, “Low Price”,  
U11H question 1.1, “High Price”  
(*) Significant at 10% (**) Significant at 5% 
 
Choice Total High Price Low Price 
Cheapest Item 87 53 37 
Not Cheapest Item  90 46 41 
Total 177 99 78 
Table 1.1.A  
Is there a difference between high and low price? (Compares 11H, 11L) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑯 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pearson’s Chi (2): 0.420 Fail to Reject Null 
Table 1.1.B 
Question 1.2 Analysis  
Condition: $ Coupon Item = $ Alternative Item 
1.2 (Key) 
12L question 1.2, “Low Price”,  
12H question 1.2, “High Price”  
 
Choice Total High Price Low Price 
Coupon Item 141 74 67 
Alternative Item  15 0 15 
Neither 21 0 21 
Total 177 74 103 
Table 1.2.A 
Is there a difference between high and low price? (Compares 12H, 12L) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑯 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pearson’s Chi (2): 0.000** Reject Null 
Table 1.2.B 
 
Does Price Specifically effect preference for the coupon item? (Compares 12H, 12L) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝒄 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pr test: Pr (|Z| > |z|) = 0.000** Reject Null 
Table 1.2.C  
Question 1.3 Analysis  
Condition: $ Sale Item = $ Coupon Item 
1.3 (Key) 
13L question 1.3, “Low Price”,  
13H question 1.3, “High Price”  
 
Choice Total High Price Low Price 
Coupon Item 104 45 59 
Sale Item  58 32 26 
Alternative Item 6 6 3 
Neither 9 3 3 
Total 177 74 103 
Table 1.3.A 
Is there a difference between high and low price? (Compares 13H, 13L) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑯 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pearson’s Chi (2): 0.338 Fail to Reject Null 
Table 1.3.B 
Is there a preference for the Coupon Item over the Sale Item? (Compares 13H, 13L) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑪 ≤ 	𝑷𝑺 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑪 > 𝑷𝑺 
Pr test: Pr (|Z| > |z|) = 0.000** Reject Null 
Table 1.3.C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 1.4 Analysis  
Condition: $ Alternative Item < $ Coupon 
Key 1.4  
14L question 1.4, “Low Price”,  
14H question 1.4, “High Price”  
 
Choice Total High Price Low Price 
Coupon Item 82 51 31 
Sale Item  26 22 4 
Cheapest Item 46 23 23 
Neither 23 4 22 
Total 177 77 100 
Table 1.4.A 
Is there a difference between high and low price? (Compares 12H, 12L) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑯 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pearson’s Chi (2): 0.000** Reject Null 
Table 1.4.B 
Is there a preference for the coupon item (C1) over the cheapest item(C2)?  
(Compares 14L, 14H) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑪𝟏 ≤ 𝑷𝑪𝟐 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑪𝟏 > 	𝑷𝑪𝟐 
Pr test: Pr (Z > z) = 0.000** Reject Null 
Table 1.4.C 
Question 1.5 Analysis  
Condition: $ Sale Item < $ Coupon Item 
Key 1.5 
15L question 1.5, “Low Price”,  
15H question 1.5, “High Price”  
 
Choice Total High Price Low Price 
Coupon Item 19 12 7 
Sale Item  141 73 66 
Neither 21 11 8 
Total  177 91 86 
Table 1.5.A 
	
 
Is there a difference between high and low price? (Compares 12H, 12L) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑯 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pearson’s Chi (2): 0.249 Fail to Reject Null 
Table 1.5.B 
Question 2.1 Analysis  
Condition: $ Restricted Item = $ Alternative Item 
2.1 (Key) 
U21L2 “Unavailable”, question 2.1, “Low Price”, Round 2 
U21H2 “Unavailable”, question 2.1, “High Price”, Round 2 
S21H2 “Sold-out”, question 2.1, “High Price”, Round 2 
S21H1 “Sold-out” question 2.1, “High Price”, Round 1 
 
Choice Total 
Restricted Item 64 
Alternative Item  39 
Neither 30 
Total 133 
Table 2.1.A (Includes U21L2, U21H2, S21H) 
Choice Total High (U21H2) Low (U21L2) 
Restricted Item 35 19 16 
Alternative Item  30 15 15 
Neither  25 8 15 
Total 90 42 46 
Table 2.1.B (Includes U21L2, U21H2)  
 
Choice Total High (S21H2) 
Restricted Item 30 30 
Alternative Item  8 8 
Neither  8 8 
Total 46 46 
Table 2.1.C (Includes S21H2 only)  
Choice Total S21H1 U21H1 U21L1 
Alternative item 105 39 32 33 
Not Alternative item 31 7 11 13 
Total 136 46 43 46 
Table 2.1.D (Includes S21H1, U21H1, U21L1 only) *Round 1 
 
 
 
Do high and low price conditions specifically effect restricted choice? (Compares U21L2 & 
U21H2) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑯 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pearson’s Chi (2): = 0.6471 Fail to Reject Null 
Table 2.1.E  
Is there a difference between unavailable and sold-out? (Compares S21H2, U21H2) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑺 ≤ 𝑷𝑼 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑺 > 	𝑷𝑼 
Pr test: Pr (Z > z) = 0.0297 ** Reject Null 
Table 2.1.F  
Is there a preference for the restricted item over the alternative item? 
 (Compares U21L2, U21H2, S21H) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑹 ≤ 𝑷𝑨 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑹 > 	𝑷𝑨 
Pr test: Pr (Z > z) = 0.000** Reject Null 
Table 2.1.G  
Question 2.2 Analysis  
Condition $ Restricted item > $ Sale Item 
2.2 (Key)  
U22L2 “Unavailable”, question 2.2, “Low Price”, Round 
2 
U22H2 “Unavailable”, question 2.2, “Low Price”, Round 
2 
S22H2 “Sold-out”, question 2.2, “High Price”, Round 2 
S22L2 “Sold-out”, question 2.2, “Low Price”, Round 2 
22SUHL1 question 2.2, Round 1 (Includes high, low, 
unavailable, sold-out conditions)  
 
Choice Total High Price Low Price 
Restricted Item 22 12 10 
Sale Item 117 58 59 
Neither 38 17 21 
Total 177 87 90 
Table 2.2.A (Includes All Scenarios)  
Choice Total Unavailable  Sold out  
Restricted Item 22 5 18 
Sale Item 117 57 60 
Neither 42 25 13 
Total 177 87 90 
Table 2.2.B (Includes All Scenarios) 
	
Choice Total 
Sale item 154 
Not Sale item 23 
Total 177 
Table 2.2.C (Includes All Scenarios) * Round 1 22SUHL1 
Is there a difference between high and low price? (Compares S22L2, U22H2, S22H2, U22L2) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑯 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pearson’s Chi (2): 0.216 Fail to Reject Null 
Table 2.2.D  
Is there a difference between unavailable and sold-out? (Compares S22L2, U22H2, S22H2, 
U22L2) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑺 ≤ 𝑷𝑼 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑺 > 	𝑷𝑴 
Pr test: Pr (Z > z) = 0.002** Reject Null 
Table 2.2.E  
Question 2.3 Analysis  
Condition: ($ Restricted Item = $ Alternative Item) < ($ Coupon Item = $ Sale Item) 
*Note: It appears some participants were given both high and low scenarios (U32H2 & U32L2) 
instead of being randomly assigned to one, (hence there are more observations than just 182) this 
does not affect the analysis  
U23L2 “Unavailable”, question 2.1, “Low Price”, Round 
2 
U23H2 “Unavailable”, question 2.1, “Low Price”, Round  
S23H2 “Sold-out”, question 2.1, “High Price”, Round 2 
S23H1 “Sold-out” question 2.1, “High Price”, Round 1 
 
Choice Total 
Coupon Item 105 
Sale Item  71 
Cheapest/Alternative Item 46 
Total 222 
Table 2.3.A (Includes S21H1 only) *Round 1 
Choice Total 
Restricted Item 55 
Sale Item 60 
Coupon Item 78 
Alternative Item 31 
Total 224 
Table 2.3.B (Includes U32H2, S31L2, U32L2) 
 
Choice Total High (U32H2) Low (U32L2) 
Restricted Item 35 19 16 
Sale Item  46 20 26 
Alternative Item 28 4 24 
Coupon Item 58 36 22 
Total 167 79 88 
Table 2.3.C 
Choice Total Low (S31L2) 
Restricted Item 8 8 
Sale Item  14 14 
Alternative Item 3 3 
Coupon Item 20 20 
Total 45 45 
Table 2.3.D 
Is there a difference between high and low price? (Compares all U23L2 & U23H2) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑯 = 𝑷𝑳 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑯 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 
Pearson’s Chi (2): 0.586* Fail to Reject Null 
Table 2.3.E 
Is there a difference between unavailable and sold-out? (Compares S23L2 and U23L2) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑺 ≥ 𝑷𝑼 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑺 < 	𝑷𝑼 
Pr test: Pr (Z < z) = 0.4431 Fail to Reject Null 
Table 2.3.F 
Is there a preference for the coupon item over the sale item? (Compares S23L2, U23L2, U32H22) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑪 ≤ 𝑷𝑺 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑪 > 	𝑷𝑺 
Pr test: Pr (Z > z) = 0.0074** Reject Null 
Table 2.3.G 
Is there a preference for the restricted item over the sale item? (Compares S23L2, U23L2, 
U32H22) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑹 ≤ 	𝑷𝑺 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑹 > 	𝑷𝑺 
Pr test: Pr (Z > z) = 0.756 Fail to Reject Null 
Table 2.3.H 
Is there a preference for the restricted item over the alternative item?  
(Compares S23L2, U23L2, U23H2) 𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑹 ≤ 	𝑷𝑨 𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑹 > 	𝑷𝑨 
Pr test: Pr (Z > z) = 0.0000** Reject Null 
Table 2.3.I 
	
	
Is there a preference for the coupon item over the 
restricted item? 
(Compares S23L2, U23L2, U23H2) 
 
𝑯𝟎: 𝑷𝑪 ≤ 	𝑷𝑹  𝑯𝒂: 𝑷𝑪 > 	𝑷𝑹	 	
Pr test: Pr (Z > z) = 0.0000** Reject Null  
Table 2.3.J 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
